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UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY IN CROATIA: 
ESTIMATION METHODS AND RESULTS
According to the Eurostat’s recommendations, GDP of each country 
must be as exhaustive as possible regarding economic activity coverage. All 
EU member states and candidate countries have a strict obligation to inclu-
de the estimate of the unoffi cial economy (UE) in offi cial GDP data. Over the 
past few years, the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (CBS) has been working on 
a project of improvement the exhaustiveness of national accounts. Recently, 
offi cial national accounts data have been revised, thus expanding coverage 
to include the estimated unoffi cial economy.
This paper deals with the comparison of results of various methods 
used for UE estimation in Croatia. Besides description of methods and re-
sults presented in recent economic literature in this paper, author presents 
Eurostat methodology for the estimation of non-exhaustiveness of national 
accounts used in Croatian national accounts. Additionally author developed 
estimation of undeclared work based on post-stratifi cation of labour force 
survey data.  
The aim of the paper is to test the hypothesis that various methods of 
UE estimation differ, in assumptions and methodology used, but all methods 
point to similar conclusion on trends of unoffi cial economy. Author found 
that in the period of economic growth, a share of unoffi cial economy is 
decreasing while in downturn phase of economic cycle unoffi cial economy 
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helps to reduce overall negative economic effects on the income of indivi-
duals. 
Key words: Unoffi cial economy, Eurostat approach, Exhaustiveness of 
national accounts, MIMIC approach, Croatia
Introduction
In each economy, a certain proportion of production, income and employ-
ment falls outside the offi cial monitoring systems. Factors behind the lack of ex-
haustiveness of national accounts could be classifi ed as: 
a) economic factors - intentional non-registration or underreporting of eco-
nomic activities and income by producers and individuals; and
b) statistical factors - statistical system is not adequate to capture total eco-
nomic activities, e.g. non-existent or obsolete registers. 
The existence of an unoffi cial economy has a negative impact on the offi cial 
economy, especially in terms of public fi nance and labour market developments. 
According to theory, unoffi cial economy has direct and indirect effects. Direct 
effect is revealed in the decreased ability of the government to collect taxes from 
economic agents. On the other hand, indirect effect is predominantly concealed in 
the inability of offi cial statistics to accurately measure economic activity. Lack of 
exhaustiveness in national accounts estimates results in distortions in international 
comparisons of macroeconomic indicators. 
According to production boundary, defi ned in the national accounts system1, 
the unoffi cial economy should be covered in the national accounts. The 1993 
SNA use the term hidden economic activities, defi ned as legal production delib-
erately concealed from public authorities to avoid payment of taxes and social 
contributions or compliance with administrative procedures and standards. Illegal 
activities are defi ned as productive activities forbidden by law or productive ac-
tivities which are usually legal but carried out by unauthorized producers. Both 
hidden and illegal activities should be included in national accounts. As national 
accounts data for European countries are used for determining contributions to 
the EU budget, European commission introduced regulation to harmonise GNI of 
the member states (regulation 1287/2003). Regulation states that national accounts 
data must be exhaustive. This means that they should account for the activities that 
are not reported in statistical surveys or to fi scal, social and other administrative 
authorities. 
1  See SNA 1993, pp. 6.30-6.36.
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The terms and the defi nition of unoffi cial economy are very broadly defi ned 
in the economic literature. Apart from unoffi cial economy, various authors in most 
cases use terms such as: hidden economy, informal economy, underground econ-
omy, black economy, unreported economy. Generally, most defi nitions agree that 
unoffi cial economy comprises of all currently unregistered productive economic 
activities: “market-based production of goods and services, whether legal or il-
legal, that escapes detection in the offi cial estimates of GDP” (Smith 1994). This 
defi nition is used, e.g., by Feige (1989, 1994), Schneider (1994, 2003, 2005) and 
Frey and Pommerehne (1984). A broader defi nition, taken from Del’Anno (2003), 
Del’Anno and Schneider (2003) and Feige (1989), is: “…those economic activities 
and the income derived from them that circumvent or otherwise avoid government 
regulation, taxation or observation”. For other defi nition see also Thomas (1999) 
or Feld and Larsen (2005).
The informal or unoffi cial economy contains that part of the economic activ-
ity that is diffi cult to measure. Thus far, different methods of unoffi cial economy 
estimation resulting in signifi cantly different estimates have been proposed in the 
literature. The results in most cases indicate that the size of the shadow economy 
is larger in the transition countries in comparison with market economies2.
The structure of this paper is as follows. After these introductory remarks, 
the fi rst section of the paper brings a short literature review on the methods for es-
timation of unoffi cial economy. Second part of the paper presents literature review 
on relation between offi cial and unoffi cial economy. In the third section of the 
paper, an estimate of the unoffi cial economy is presented for the Croatian economy 
in the period 2000-2010. In comparison the author used results from two published 
studies which comprised Croatia and presents own calculations based on the Euro-
stat approach and labour market method. The last section concludes. 
1. Methods for estimating the size of underground economy 
In this section, a brief overview of the methods for estimation of the size of 
unoffi cial economy (UE) is given. There are numerous methods for an estimate of 
the UE. Some of them are more applicable to the developed countries while oth-
ers are more suitable for estimation of UE in transition economies. According to 
the numbers of approaches applied by different researchers, and the diversity of 
their views, one can conclude that there is no universal approach capable of being 
2  Recent estimates of the size of the shadow economy for 22 transition countries and 21 
OECD countries could be found in Schneider (2012). For the estimates for a larger sample of 
countries see Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (2000).
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applied to all countries or even to the same country at different periods of time. 
The best method of estimation, in each individual case, depends on the specifi c 
features of the economy. According to their common characteristics and authors 
who developed the method, the following classifi cation can be used: 
Table 1. 
CLASSIFICATION OF METHODS FOR ESTIMATING THE SIZE OF UE
Direct methods Indirect methods Causal methods Eurostat approach
1) Questionnaires
2) Tax statistics
1)  Difference between 
tax statistics and the 
national accounts








4)  Labour market
5)  Cash in circulation
6)  Transaction method 
(Feige)
7)  Use of physical 
inputs method 
(Lacko)
1) Demand for 
cash (Tanzi)




1) Exhaustiveness of 
national accounts
Source: Schneider (2012, 2002), Smith and Wied-Nebbeling (1986).
A detailed description of all disadvantages and advantages related to the use 
of particular approach see in Schneider (2002, 2012), Prokhorov (2001), Enste and 
Schneider (2000). The results of different methods indicate a possible size of UE 
in an economy, but reliability is related to the plausibility of the assumptions. 
Data availability issues cause serious diffi culties in the search for comprehen-
sive and methodologically comparable UE studies in transition countries. Namely, 
the most commonly used approach in market economies is the monetary approach 
that is not applicable in Croatian case due to deepening of the fi nancial markets 
and high level of eurisation which signifi cantly infl uenced trends in monetary ag-
gregates denominated in domestic currency. In Croatian case a signifi cant propor-
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tion of informal transactions are related to Euro transactions and therefore avoid to 
be recorded in the offi cial monetary statistics. Volume of foreign currency outside 
the standard monetary system is virtually impossible to estimate. 
Due to data limitation, fi ve different approaches are used to estimate the size 
of the underground economy in Croatia. The fi rst two methods are the so called in-
put approach, which uses electricity consumption data as an indicator (Kaufmann-
Kaliberda method, Lacko method). The third one is the DYMIMIC approach, la-
bour market method is the fourth available method and the last but most detailed 
method is the so-called Eurostat exhaustiveness of national accounts approach. In 
the recent economic literature there are no studies for analysed period which com-
prised Croatian economy and which are based on input approach for UE estima-
tion.  Therefore in empirical part I compare the results from two papers based on 
MIMIC approach and results of two methods based on own calculation (Eurostat 
and labour market method). In the continuation a short description of methods of 
UE estimation is given. 
Although physical input approach has already been used in underground 
economy estimates, the application of the Kaufmann-Kaliberda method has de-
veloped relatively recently3. In order to measure the total economic activity of a 
national economy, Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) assume that electricity con-
sumption is the best physical indicator. Advantage of this method is simplicity and 
data availability. Total (offi cial) economic activity data as well as electricity con-
sumption data are available for the majority of the economies. The authors also as-
sume that the electricity consumption is a good indicator of the total GDP (offi cial 
and unoffi cial) trend as the short-term elasticity is equal to one4. Therefore, they 
assume that the difference between electricity consumption growth rate and the 
offi cial GDP growth rate is a consequence of the underground economy. The criti-
cism of this method5 includes that electricity is not a signifi cant input in certain 
underground activities (namely personal and business services), and alternative 
energy sources can also be used (such as coal, oil, etc.) and therefore this method 
only partially measures the true size of the underground economy. Furthermore, 
energy production and consumption are today far more effi cient than in the past 
period. Finally, there are signifi cant differences and variations in the elasticity 
ratios between GDP and electricity consumption, both dynamically and across 
different countries.
The Lacko method (Lacko, 1998) assumes that a certain amount of under-
ground economic activity is connected with household electricity consumption. 
Based on a cross-country analysis, an econometric regression is estimated. The 
3  This method has been used by Portes (1996), Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996).
4  Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997).
5  Schneider (2002).
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dependant variable is the per capita household electricity consumption, and the 
independent variables are the following: average real per capita expenditure, elec-
tricity price, number of heating months, the proportion of the other energy sources 
consumption and per capita underground economy output. This last variable is cal-
culated in another regression as a function of personal income tax ratio, company 
profi ts and overall tax burden on goods and services, as well as the ratio of public 
expenditure in the GDP and the share of dependant population in total population. 
Merging the two equations results in the expected household electricity consump-
tion in each country. The difference between observed and expected consumption 
is assigned to electricity consumption in the underground economy. 
The critique of this method is similar to the Kaufmann-Kaliberda method 
and Johnson et al. electricity method6. Firstly, a considerable energy input is not 
a prerequisite for all underground activities, as other energy sources can be used. 
Next, underground economy is not restricted to household sector. The notion that 
the UE can be explained by the proportion of public sector size is disputable, espe-
cially in the transition economies and developing countries. Finally, it is question-
able which estimate value of the unit of the electricity is the most reliable input for 
estimating GDP per capita. 
Determinants/indicators – the MIMIC model. Majority of the described 
methods used a single indicator of underground economy size and dynamics in 
order to estimate the UE size. It is, however, clear that the underground economy 
affects the product market, labour market and the monetary markets simultane-
ously. The model approach therefore, explicitly considers multiple causes and ef-
fects of the underground economy. The method is based on the “latent variable”7 
statistical theory. Factorial analysis is used to empirically evaluate the parameters 
linking the determinants of UE with the indicators. A group of structural equa-
tions is used to evaluate the unknown value of the coeffi cients. The DYMIMIC 
approach (dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes) consists of two parts. The 
measurement model connects the latent variables with known indicators. Thus, 
Frey considered the causes, which are commonly used in the MIMIC models8: 
the offi cial economy tax burden; tax morale and public administration capacity; 
labour market conditions; structural factors (specifi c characteristics of various sec-
tors and activities within the economy). A limitation of this method is the fact that 
it only provides information on the relative size of the underground economy9. 
6  Prokhorov (2001), Schneider (2002), Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997).
7  Unobserved variables (see in  Aigner, Scheider and Ghosh, 1988).
8  Prokhorov (2001).
9  For further details, please refer to Schneider (2012), Giles and Tedds (2002), Giles, Tedds 
and Gugsa (1999).
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2. Relation between offi cial and unoffi cial economy – literature review
Majority of methods for unoffi cial economy estimation presented in previ-
ous chapter are based on the attempts to divide total economic activity on offi cial 
(recorded in the offi cial national accounts data) and unoffi cial part. The relation 
between unoffi cial and offi cial economy is very important not only for estima-
tion purposes but also from economic policy point of view. Economic agents are 
primarily concerned with total income (which comprises unoffi cial part). On the 
other hand, a rising share of unoffi cial income can cause signifi cant problems for 
public sector. Shadow economic activities are also signifi cant and alarming in 
developed countries. The recent crisis in Greece has demonstrated the negative 
outcomes of a signifi cant shadow economy on tax bases and social security sys-
tems (Buehen, Schneider, 2012). Besides Greece, economies with share of infor-
mal economy above the average recorded unfavourable budgetary position. Most 
of estimation methods use offi cial data from standard statistical system as indica-
tors and determinants which point to the size of UE sector. Because of that, in 
this chapter a short literature review on relation between offi cial and unoffi cial 
economy is given. According to a number of studies (Enste and Schneider 2006; 
Feld and Schneider 2010), the situation of the offi cial economy plays a crucial role 
in people’s decision to engage in unoffi cial sector. In periods of economic expan-
sion there are a lot of opportunities to increase income in the offi cial economy. 
Opposite is the case in a recession when individuals try to compensate decreasing 
income from the offi cial economy through engagement in unoffi cial sector.
Houston (1990) developed a simple macroeconomic model to incorporate the 
unoffi cial economy. The model suggests how traditional macroeconomic models 
may be limited by their failure to consider the underground economy. Given that 
the underground economy represents a portion of total output, its size and impact 
should be of importance to macroeconomists. He demonstrated that total aggre-
gate supply varies less than formal supply in response to shifts in marginal tax 
rates. This was shown to partially offset the position that higher taxation leads to 
dramatic supply reductions, which negatively affect prices and interest rates. The 
same author pointed to implications for the conduct of monetary policy because of 
high currency-intensive nature of unoffi cial activities. 
Gershuni (1979) presented a relationship between offi cial and unoffi cial 
economy with a circle fl ow of economy diagram. Left side of picture 1 presents 
the fl ows in the economy without informal production. Formal producers employ 
labour and deliver goods and services to households. Household sector receive 
wages for labour input and use it to buy goods and services from formal producers. 
Right side of the picture presents fl ows in the situation when part of the pro-
duction is unoffi cial or informal. The household sector buys goods and services 
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and chooses between formal and informal producers. On the labour supply side, 
individuals decide to work in offi cial or unoffi cial economy. Those are factors in 
favour of conclusion that offi cial and unoffi cial sectors are substitutes. 
On the other hand, households spend a signifi cant part of the income gener-
ated in informal production on goods and services produced by formal producers. 
In the production process informal producers use inputs (intermediate goods and 
services) from the formal producers. Those are factors supporting opinion that 
offi cial and unoffi cial economy are complements, i.e. rise of unoffi cial economy 
could induce rise of offi cial sectors and vice versa. 
Picture 1. 
ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS IN FORMAL AND INFORMAL ECONOMY
Source: Gershuni (1979)
The literature dealing with the correlation between the formal and informal 
economy, so far has not produced the fi nal answer whether this relation is positive 
or negative. According to Chen (2007) there are at least three schools of thought 
on links between shadow and formal economy. The dualists argue that informal 
units and activities have few (if any) linkages to the formal economy but, rather, 
operate as a distinct separate sector of the economy; and that informal workers 
comprise the less-advantaged sector of a dualistic labour market. Hypothesis is 
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fore lower quality and quantity of public goods and services, which ultimately 
has negative impact on economic growth of formal economy (Nikopour, Shah 
Habibullah and Schneider, 2010). According to structuralism approach, unoffi cial 
and offi cial sectors are intrinsically linked. To increase competitiveness, fi rms in 
the formal economy are seen to reduce their input costs, including labour costs, by 
promoting informal production. The economic explanation is that the value- added 
created in the shadow economy is spent in the offi cial sector, while more offi cial 
production increases the demand of unoffi cial goods and service. The legalists fo-
cus on the relationship between informal entrepreneurs/enterprises and the formal 
regulatory environment, not formal fi rms. They acknowledge that capitalist inter-
ests collude with government to set the bureaucratic ‘rules of the game’.
In the neoclassical view, the shadow economy is positive in the sense that 
it responds to the economic environment’s demand for services and small-scale 
manufacturing (Asea, 1996). Adam and Ginsberg (1985) proposed the theoretical 
model in which, under the assumption of low entering cost to the informal sec-
tor, a positive relationship could be established. Empirical analysis conducted on 
data for Belgium confi rmed these results. Recent models also indicate a positive 
relationship. For example, Bhattacharyya (1999) argues that it is necessary for the 
shadow economy growth to positively infl uence the growth of the offi cial sector, 
the main channel being personal consumption. Specifi cally, Bhattacharyya (1999) 
claims that signifi cant share of funds which the agents acquire in the shadow mar-
ket create additional demand, which can positively infl uence the growth of the 
offi cial sector. Similarly, Schneider (1998) shows that over 66% of the earnings in 
the shadow economy are almost immediately spent in the offi cial sector. 
Specifi cally, Eilat and Zinnes (2000) argue that the growth of the shadow 
economy share up to the levels registered in transition countries is actually a way 
of structural adjustment to new market conditions. They assume that the slow de-
velopment of market institutions in the transition economies forced the part of the 
agents to conduct their activities in the unoffi cial sector. However, once the market 
institutions are adequately developed, those agents would fi nd it more profi table to 
organize their activities in the regulated sector. In that context, it could be expect-
ed that as the transition economies recover from the transition crises, the shadow 
economy size will decrease signifi cantly.
On the opposite side, Loayza (1996) and Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lo-
baton (1998) study the effect of the shadow economy size on the rate of economic 
growth within the public good framework and fi nd signifi cant negative relation. 
Enste and Schneider (2002) point out that the presence of a large shadow economy, 
where free-riding on public services paid for by few is common, could lead to 
a sense of unfairness and deepen the distrust toward the ability of the political 
system to govern. It is not clear to what extent the shadow economy is the cause 
of bad morals rather than just an indicator of a legitimacy of the social and eco-
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nomic order.  According to Eilat (2002) another potential concern of an expanding 
shadow economy is the possible reduced eligibility of social services for workers 
in the shadow fi rms. Knack and Keefer (1997) fi nd a strong and signifi cantly posi-
tive relationship between social capital variable (measured as willingness to pay 
taxes) and economic growth. Therefore one may conclude that there is a negative 
relationship between the unoffi cial economy (higher tax avoidance) and formal 
economy.
For the group of transition economies, Feige (2001) worked on the correla-
tion between the shadow economy and the offi cial economy growth applying the 
regression for each country in the sample. The method applied clearly point out the 
negative correlation between the offi cial and the unoffi cial sector in most analyzed 
countries. Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) have analysed the interdependence be-
tween the shadow economy growth rate and the offi cially registered growth rate 
for larger number of countries, but their research has focused on the early phase of 
transition. They have found that the shadow economy was used as the buffer dur-
ing the early phases of transition, when the offi cially registered output has dropped 
severely. By applying the OLS method, they have found out that the cumulative 
drop of the offi cially registered GDP by 10 percent will result in the growth of the 
shadow economy of nearly 4 percent. 
Botrić, Marić and Mikulić (2004) focused on the informal sector and formal 
sector relationship by panel data analysis. The regressions are conducted sepa-
rately for transition and developed countries. Results indicated that there are dif-
ferences between the transition and developed economies regarding unoffi cial/offi -
cial economy relation. The decrease of the unoffi cial economy has positive impact 
on the rate of growth in the transition economies. In the developed economies, the 
link is vaguely positive, as indicated in previous studies.
Obviously, there is not a universal answer for the question whether the rela-
tionship between the offi cial and the unoffi cial economy is positive or negative. 
This relationship depends on specifi c features of the individual economy and nu-
merous socio-economic and legal factors. According to Nikopour, Shah Habibul-
lah and Schneider (2010) the shadow activity is a “second best” alternative that 
contributes to the production of consumer and producer goods and, consequently, 
to economic growth. They conclude that compared to a Pareto optimal economy, 
shadow economy activity would appear to reduce the rate of growth, but in the 
real world the economy is not at an optimum. Given the real world with poorly de-
fi ned and enforced property rights, poorly designed and often excessive regulation, 
corruption, and poor tax administration, the shadow economy may contribute to 
economic growth. Inclusion of underground economy may have important conse-
quences for meeting Maastricht criteria especially for countries applying for euro 
adoption (Lovrinčević, Marić, Mikulić 2006).
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3. Estimates of unoffi cial economy in Croatia 
In this chapter estimates of the size of unoffi cial economy in Croatia based 
on different methods are pooled together. Aim of this comparison is to determine 
range of UE in Croatia and to test whether different methods, although based on 
various assumptions resulting with signifi cantly different estimated size of infor-
mal sector, agree on the trend of UE activities.    The results from two studies 
based on MIMIC approach and results of two method based on own calculation 
are compared (Eurostat and labour market method). 
3.1. Estimates based on MIMIC approach
The main idea behind MIMIC approach is to determine the relationship be-
tween an unobservable variable (unoffi cial economy), and a set of indicators related 
to UE which are available in standard statistical system. In particular, the MIMIC 
model compares a sample covariance matrix, i.e. the covariance matrix of the ob-
servable variables, with the parametric structure imposed on it by a hypothesized 
mode (Buehen, Schneider, 2012; Schenider 2012). For this purpose, the unoffi cial 
economy is related to the selected indicator variables in a factor analytical model. 
The relationships between the unobservable variable and the observable explana-
tory (causal) variables or determinants are specifi ed through a structural model.
In the MIMIC approach there are various factors determining relative sig-
nifi cance of unoffi cial economy and relation to the offi cial economy. Observable 
indicators which “cause” UE according to the theoretical papers are following 
(Frey and Pommerehne, 1984; Feld, 2010, Schneider and Enste, 2000; Buehen, 
Schneider, 2012; Schenider 2012):
a) Burdens on the offi cial economy;
b) Public sector services;
c) Tax morality and government controls;
d) Labour market conditions;
e) Structural factors.
All of above factors have an impact on relation between formal and informal 
economy. If tax burden is rising, we can expect rising share of unoffi cial economy. 
The higher the difference between the total cost of labour in the offi cial economy 
and after-tax earnings from work, the greater is the incentive to work in the un-
offi cial economy. Empirical evidence on the infl uence of the tax burden on the 
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shadow economy is provided by Schneider (1994, 2005), Johnson, Kaufmann and 
Zoido-Lobatón (1998), Feld (2010).
An increase of the unoffi cial economy can lead to reduced public revenues 
from taxes which in turn reduce the quality and quantity of public goods and 
services. Ultimately, this can lead to an increase in the tax rates for fi rms and indi-
viduals in the offi cial sector, quite often combined with deterioration in the quality 
of public goods and of the administration, leading to an even stronger incentive to 
participate in the shadow economy (Feld and Schneider, 2010).
A lower tax morality leads to an increased readiness to become active in the 
hidden economy. A growing intensity of public controls and a rise in expected 
punishment ceteris paribus reduces the return on hidden activities and therefore 
has the opposite effect according to Frey and Pommerehne (1984). Johnson, Kauf-
mann, and Shleifer (1997) predict that ceteris paribus countries with higher gen-
eral regulation of their economies tend to have a higher share of the unoffi cial 
economy in total GDP. Underground economy is also very often closely linked to 
corruption (Lovrinčević, Mikulić, Budak 2006).
If labour market conditions are improving in terms of higher labour demand 
in offi cial sectors, individuals have a stronger negotiation position and ask to be 
included in social security schemes. If labour demand is weak, individuals are 
more concentrated on short-term perspective (current income) and neglect loss 
of potential social benefi ts in the future.  Additionally, the longer offi cial work-
ing time, the higher are the opportunity costs of taking up additional work in the 
hidden economy. Unemployment benefi ts also infl uence readiness of workers to 
participate in offi cial economy. If the wage of illicit work and the fi nancial aid to-
gether yield more income than regular and overtime work, taking also into account 
the costs of detection and punishment and assuming risk neutrality, full-time illicit 
work as an unemployed person yields ceteris paribus a higher utility (Enste and 
Schneider, 2002).
MIMIC approach is applied in the study of Schneider (2012) and Buehen, 
Schneider (2012). Determinants used as possible causes of unoffi cial economy 
were the following: size of government, share of direct taxation, fi scal freedom, 
business freedom, unemployment rate, government effectiveness and sub-nation-
al government employment. In their model, authors used the following variables 
as possible indicators of the size of UE: currency in circulation, labour force 
participation rate and GDP per capita. They found that the variables capturing 
the burden of taxation (in a wide sense), i.e. the size of government and fi scal 
freedom, unemployment rate and business freedom have the expected signs and 
are statistically signifi cant. Indicator variables - the labour force participation rate 
and GDP per capita are also found to be statistically signifi cant and showing the 
expected signs.
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Results of their estimate are presented in Table 1. As can be seen, Croatia 
recorded above average share of unoffi cial economy in the GDP. From the set of 
analysed countries only Bulgaria and Romania recorded higher unoffi cial economy. 
Second conclusion is that estimated size of unoffi cial economy is higher in new 
member states which is expected result having in mind that NMS are lacking be-
hind old EU countries not only in terms of economic development but also regard-
ing overall institutional environment. In the both subsamples (NMS and OECD-EU 
countries) one can notice a decreasing trend in unoffi cial economy in the 2000-2008 
period. Impact of recession is slightly different. While unoffi cial economy in old 
EU member countries on average increased in 2009, majority of new member states 
recorded a growth of unoffi cial economy in 2009 and slight increase in 2010. Ac-
cording to that criterion Croatian economy has been more similar to the group of old 
EU member countries and has experienced increase in unoffi cial economy in 2009.
Table 2. 
ESTIMATES OF THE UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY BASED ON MIMIC APPROACH 
IN STUDIES BUEHEN, SCHNEIDER (2012) AND SCHENIDER (2012)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
NMS* 27.4 27.1 26.8 26.4 26.0 25.5 24.9 24.6 24.7 24.2 24.3
Bulgaria 36.9 36.6 36.1 35.6 34.9 34.1 33.5 33.0 33.7 32.1 31.9
Czech Republic 19.1 18.9 18.8 18.7 18.4 17.8 17.3 16.3 15.2 15.7 15.4
Estonia 25.6 25.3 24.9 24.3 24.0 23.4 22.7 22.5 20.8 24.3 22.5
Hungary 25.1 24.8 24.5 24.4 24.1 24.0 23.7 23.7 23.1 23.1 23.1
Latvia 23.6 23.2 22.9 22.5 22.1 21.5 20.8 20.8 22.6 20.0 21.5
Lithuania 27.1 26.7 26.2 25.4 25.1 24.4 23.8 24.3 26.0 23.6 25.4
Poland 27.6 27.7 27.7 27.5 27.3 26.9 26.4 25.4 24.7 24.6 23.8
Romania 34.4 33.7 33.5 32.8 32.0 31.7 30.7 30.8 31.5 30.0 30.9
OECD-EU* 18.6 18.4 18.4 18.5 18.4 18.4 18.2 18.0 18.0 18.5 18.5
Austria 9.8 9.7 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.6 9.7 9.5 9.7 10.6
Belgium 22.2 22.1 22.0 22.0 21.8 21.8 21.4 20.8 20.3 20.5 20.7
Ireland 15.9 15.9 15.9 16.0 15.8 15.6 15.5 15.4 15.9 17.5 16.5
Italy 27.1 26.7 26.8 27.0 27.0 27.1 26.9 26.8 26.7 26.5 26.7
Netherlands 13.1 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.1 12.7 12.9 13.6
Spain 22.7 22.4 22.4 22.4 22.5 22.4 22.4 22.3 22.9 24.5 23.5
Sweden 19.2 19.1 19.0 18.7 18.5 18.6 18.2 18.0 17.7 17.9 18.1
Croatia 33.4 33.2 32.6 32.1 31.7 31.3 30.8 30.4 29.6 30.1 29.8
*unweighted average
Source: Buehen, Schneider (2012) and Schenider (2012)
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Klarić (2011) also applied the MIMIC model to the Croatian economy. In 
his model a standard set of observable variables are used: data on taxes and con-
tributions collected unemployment rate, GDP and monetary indicators. Results 
are presented in chart 1 which point to the same conclusion on decreasing share 
of unoffi cial economy till the year 2009. Comparison of this estimate and other 
methods will be elaborated in next chapter.
Chart 1: 
ESTIMATE OF UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY IN CROATIA BASED 
ON MIMIC APPROACH PRESENTED IN KLARIĆ (2011), 
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3.2. Estimate of non-exhaustiveness of national accounts in Croatia 
based on Eurostat approach
The basic methodology used to estimate the size of UE is the Eurostat‘s Tab-
ular Approach to Exhaustiveness. This approach provides a framework for the es-
timate of the UE that is particularly well suited for transition countries. According 
to this approach, different types of non-exhaustiveness have to be precisely defi ned 
and separated. All types of non-exhaustiveness are systematically covered and are 
mutually excluded. Main advantage of this method comes from the possibility of 
a comparison of different types of non-exhaustiveness adjustments by countries. 
This is the most conservative method because the results are lower in comparison 
with other methods used to estimate the unoffi cial economy. The classifi cation of 
non-exhaustiveness types in the national accounts is based on various character-
istics of the producer, i.e. the way in which data is obtained from producers. The 
classifi cation of non-exhaustiveness types in the national accounts is elaborated in 
Lovrinčević, Mikulić, Galić Nagyszombaty (2011) and here is presented only sum-
mary of the method and types of UE.
N1 Producer should have registered (underground producer)
N2 Illegal producer that fails to register
N3 Producer is not obliged to register 
N4 Registered legal person is not included in statistics 
N5 Registered entrepreneur is not included in statistics
N6 Mis-reporting by the producer 
N7 Statistical defi ciencies in the data
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Table 3 shows the results according to the specifi c types of the total exhaus-
tiveness adjustments according to Eurostat’s approach. Type N6 (inaccurate re-
porting by producers) is the most signifi cant in all period. N6 is estimated between 
11.8 billion HRK in 2000 and 17 billion HRK in 2009.
Chart 2.
NON-EXHAUSTIVENESS TYPES
Chart 2. presents the shares of different types of non-exhaustiveness adjust-
ments. In the chart is given average shares according to types in period 2000 – 
2009. It is obvious that type N6 (inaccurate reporting by producers) is the most 
signifi cant in all observed period. Average share of type N6 is 72% of total non-
exhaustiveness adjustments. Then follow illegal activities with share of 11%. Type 
N2 are not included in offi cial GDP at the moment because further investigates in 
this area will be done. Types N1, N3, N5 and N7 are estimated between 3 and 6% 
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Table 4. 
EXHAUSTIVENESS ADJUSTMENTS BY ACTIVITY; AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF GROSS VALUE ADDED (GVA) OF ACTIVITY10
Activities, NACE 2002
% in Gross Value Added
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
A + B 13,87 11,89 12,47 12,74 11,27 10,52 9,67 9,46 8,38
C + D + E 11,00 9,66 10,91 8,12 6,96 7,66 6,75 6,35 6,32
F 20,65 22,55 18,73 17,88 19,64 16,43 14,18 12,16 10,99
G 20,96 20,80 15,56 14,70 14,20 14,57 13,48 12,25 11,78
H 23,60 25,03 24,74 24,10 25,42 26,43 24,38 24,20 23,79
I 7,62 7,12 6,60 5,47 6,32 6,93 6,77 6,11 5,98
J + K 5,47 5,36 6,49 5,99 5,89 5,31 5,20 4,63 4,35
L to O 3,29 2,30 3,12 2,26 1,92 1,99 1,77 1,65 1,54
Source: CBS, calculation of the authors.
Table 4 presents exhaustiveness adjustments by activities as a percentage of 
Gross Value Added of activity. NACE H (Hotels and restaurants) has the great-
est share in total non-exhaustiveness adjustments in whole period. Average share 
of activity H is 24.6% in GVA of specifi c activity.  This is followed by NACE 
F (Construction) with average 17% of GVA and NACE G (Wholesale and retail 
trade) with 15.4% of GVA. As evident, in the period of dynamic economic growth, 
although stagnant in nominal terms (current price value), the unoffi cial economy 
was constantly reducing its share in offi cial GDP. The most signifi cant reduction 
in share of unoffi cial economy in GVA was recorded in construction and trade. 
On the other hand, unoffi cial economy in activity hotels and restaurants recorded 
stable share in GVA.
3.3. Estimate of unoffi cial economy by labour market approach
Offi cial data for hidden economy measured by Eurostat methodology for last 
two years (2010 and 2011) are not available yet. Impact of recession on unoffi cial 
economy in this paper is estimated on labour force survey data.  In this paper, 
10   Data for 2009 are not available according to NACE 2002.
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post-stratifi cation of labour force survey data is used to improve the precision of 
estimation of labour force data. The post-strata are constructed by sex (2 classes), 
and age group (5 groups). The weights are based on independently derived popula-
tion fi gures. Offi cial CBS data on population are used but in this paper persons not 
present in Croatia for period longer than 1 year11 are not included.
Total employment according to post-stratifi ed LFS data (in table marked as 
LFS) is calculated using the following formula:
where eij is employment rate for population in group i12 and gender j13 and Pij 
marks population in the same group. 
Total difference in employment between labour force survey and offi cial 
CBS fi gures (OF), besides unregistered employees engaged in market activities, 
comprise a group of self-employed persons in agriculture which are primarily 
producers of agricultural products for their own consumption (OAA). In OAA 
group there is a signifi cant share of population older than 65 which are classifi ed 
as employed in LFS because they work occasionally for compensation in cash or 
kind. Because of limited impact of own account agricultural workers on rest of 
the economy and probably low value of production, estimate of employment in 
unoffi cial economy (UE presented in the last row of the table) do not comprise 
the OAA group.
11  According to census data, 226.151 persons were abroad during census period, but because 
of occasional visits to their families in Croatia, those persons were included in total population. In 
2011 census only persons that visit Croatia on weekly basis will be included in total population of 
Republic of Croatia.
12  i=1, for population aged 0-14, i=2 for population aged 15-24, i = 3 for population aged 
25-49, i = 4 for population aged 50-64 and i = 5 for population older than 65.
13  j=1 for males and j=2 for females.
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Table 5. 
ESTIMATE OF UNREGISTERED EMPLOYMENT 
BY LABOUR FORCE SURVEY 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010e
Employment rates - men (offi cial LFS data)
15-24 31,9 30 29,1 31,6 33,2 31 29,1
25-49 79,1 79,04 79,7 82,5 83,5 80,4 76,1
50-64 53,6 54,9 55,4 58,4 58 57,6 56,7
65+ 9,7 9,1 8,3 6,2 6,3 7,4 6,8
Employment rates - women (offi cial LFS data)
15-24 21,7 21,3 21,8 21,1 20,6 19,4 18,4
25-49 67,3 69,6 69,5 71,3 72,6 72,3 69,8
50-64 32,1 33,6 35,8 35,8 37,4 39,8 39,15
65+ 6,2 5,6 5,8 4,5 5 4,8 4,3
Employment (post-stratifi ed LFS) – men
15-24 92,1 85,4 81,9 87,5 90,2 82,8 76,0
25-49 580,4 578,5 584,8 601,1 607,7 584,3 550,7
50-64 190,7 199,2 205,3 219,9 221,1 223,6 224,9
65+ 27,8 26,5 23,9 18,5 19,0 22,4 20,5
891,0 889,7 895,8 927,0 938,0 913,1 872,1
Employment (post-stratifi ed LFS) - women
15-24 59,9 58,1 58,8 55,9 53,4 49,4 46,0
25-49 494,9 510,9 511,0 519,3 527,2 523,6 502,6
50-64 128,0 135,6 146,9 148,8 157,1 169,7 170,2
65+ 28,2 25,8 26,5 21,1 23,6 22,7 20,2
711,0 730,4 743,3 745,2 761,3 765,4 739,0
Estimate of total employment - post-stratifi ed LFS
Total LFS 1.602,0 1.620,1 1.639,1 1.672,2 1.699,3 1.678,5 1.611,1
Offi cial employment
Total OF 1409 1420 1468 1517 1555 1499 1427
Difference post-stratifi ed LFS data and offi cial employment
LFS - OF 193,0 200,1 171,1 155,2 144,3 179,5 184,1
Self-employment in agriculture - low scale primarily 
own-account production
OAA 136,9 147,1 121,9 108,9 117,7 122,5 124,5
Estimate of employment in unoffi cial economy
UE = LFS-OF-OAA 56,1 53,0 49,2 46,3 26,6 57,0 59,6
(UE as % of OF) 4,0 3,7 3,4 3,1 1,7 3,8 4,2
  eData for 2010 are estimated, offi cial data are not available for 4th quarter of 2010.
Source: CBS, calculation of the authors.
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As can be seen from the table, a downward trend in unoffi cial employment 
has been recorded in the period 2004-2008. Offi cial economy growth and im-
proved labour market conditions resulted in the decrease of unoffi cial employment 
from 56.1 thousands in 2004 to 26.6 thousands in 2008. As a percentage of offi cial 
employment, hidden employees had a share of 4.0% in 2004 and only 1.7% in 
2008. The trend reversed in 2009 and the share of hidden employees increased to 
3.8% in 2009 and 4.2% in 2010. 
Offi cial fi gures point to a decrease of more than 50 thousands employees 
in 2009. On the other hand, according to post-stratifi ed LFS data, reduction in 
employment was only 20 thousands and the difference is attributed to the unof-
fi cial economy growth. In 2010 both offi cial employment and LFS fi gures indicate 
signifi cant reductions in employment. Obviously, in an attempt to compensate for 
the revenue drop (as a consequence of reduced demand), economic agents tried to 
reduce labour costs through tax evasion. 
4. Comparison of unoffi cial economy estimates based on different 
methods
In this chapter a comparison of UE estimates is presented for the Croatian 
economy. Firstly one can notice that MIMIC approach as presented by Buehen, 
Schneider (2012) is on average higher than estimates used in Eurostat non-exhaus-
tiveness (NOE) project aimed on inclusion of UE in offi cial national accounts. As 
can be seen from Table 6, unweighted average for NOE adjustment in new member 
states was 11,1% of GDP which is almost double in comparison to old member 
states labelled as OECD-EU. Buehen and Schneider (2012) also found a signifi cant 
higher share of unoffi cial economy in NMS. Their estimate is on average 2.7 times 
higher than NOE adjustment for NMS while in the subset of old member states the 
same indicator is 6.4 with signifi cant dispersion among countries. For Croatia this 
ratio stands at 3.3 which is closer to NMS economies.
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Table 6. 
COMPARISON OF UE ESTIMATES BASED ON EXHAUSTIVENESS 












NMS 11,1 29,6 2,7
Bulgaria 2001 10,2 36,6 3,6
Czech Republic 2000 4,6 19,1 4,2
Estonia 2002 9,6 32,0 3,3
Hungary 2000 11,9 25,1 2,1
Latvia 2000 8,3 29,8 3,6
Lithuania 2002 18,9 32,8 1,7
Poland 2002 7,8 27,7 3,6
Romania 2002 17,7 33,5 1,9
OECD-EU 6,2 18,6 6,4
Austria 2001 7,9 9,7 1,2
Belgium 2002 3,0 22,0 7,3
Ireland 1998 4,0 16,1 4,0
Italy 2003 14,8 27,0 1,8
Netherlands 1995 1,0 13,3 13,3
Spain 2000 11,2 22,7 2,0
Sweden 2000 1,3 19,2 14,8
Croatia 2002 10,1 33,3 3,3
*unweighted average
Source: Buehen, Schneider (2012) and Schneider (2012)
Although differences in results are relatively high, one can notice that there 
are some similarities in ranks of UE with some outliers (chart 3.). Starting from re-
sults from Eurostat exhaustiveness project one could expect slightly higher MIM-
IC estimate for Austria, Italy, Hungary and Spain. 
A. GALIĆ: Unoffi cial Economy in Croatia: Estimation Methods and Results
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 63 (12) 734-762 (2012)756
Chart 3. 
RANKING OF COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO THE SIZE 
OF UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY
Source: Buehen, Schneider (2012) and Schneider (2012)
Next table presents comparison of UE estimates based on four different 
methods described in previous chapter. The lowest share of UE is estimated 
by labour force method but one has to bear in mind that this estimate relates 
only to one part of unoffi cial economy – unregistered labour. A certain propor-
tion of informal activities can be expected in registered units (as is presented in 
Eurostat approach under heading N6). Registered units are often deliberately 
underreporting income for tax purposes. Table 7. points to impossibility to get 
the fi nal answer on the question how big unoffi cial economy is. Various methods 
could apply different defi nition and terminology, use specifi c assumptions and 
analytical procedures. If defi nitions and assumptions differ, it is expected that 
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Table 7. 









2000 8,5 33,4 6,7
2001 8,3 33,2 6,2
2002 8,2 32,6 5,3
2003 7,4 32,1 5,4
2004 7,3 31,7 4 5,3
2005 7,3 31,3 3,7 4,9
2006 6,7 30,8 3,4 4,8
2007 6,1 30,4 3,1 4,7
2008 5,9 29,6 1,7 4,6
2009 6,4 30,1 3,8 4,2
2010 29,8 4,2
Sources: Buehen, Schneider (2012), Klarić (2011), own calculations
Although the exact size of unoffi cial economy for Croatia is unknown be-
cause of relatively high range of estimated results, one could notice that all the 
methods applied point to the same conclusion that unoffi cial economy has been 
decreasing (as percentage of GDP) in period 2000-2008. This conclusion is in 
accordance with recent literature which found negative relationship between of-
fi cial and unoffi cial economy. In the period of economic expansion an additional 
income could be realised through offi cial and registered activities and motivation 
for engagement in UE sector is lower.
According to three out of four methods, in recession period, unoffi cial econ-
omy increased in terms of GDP. According to literature, factor behind these re-
sults is an attempt of economic units (households and corporations) to compensate 
decrease of offi cial income with unoffi cial activities. In opposition, Klarić (2011) 
found continuation of decreasing trend of unoffi cial economy even in 2009 when 
recession started. He explains it with possibility that the economic crisis and the 
measures to counteract it, left the entire economy shaken up and some time for all 
the subjects to adapt to the new situation is required. Some of the variables used 
to model the NOE probably lag in showing the full effects of global economic 
phenomena such as the crisis. The NOE itself in reality probably lags even further, 
needing time to respond to the major changes in the values of its causes. 
A. GALIĆ: Unoffi cial Economy in Croatia: Estimation Methods and Results
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 63 (12) 734-762 (2012)758
Chart 4. 
TRENDS IN UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY 
IN CROATIA BASED ON VARIOUS METHODS
Sources: Buehen, Schneider (2012), Klarić (2011), own calculations
5. Conclusion
According to the number of approaches applied by different researchers, and 
the diversity of their views, one can conclude that there is no universal approach 
capable of being applied to all of the countries or even to the same country at dif-
ferent periods of time.  The best method of estimation, in each individual case, 
depends on the specifi c features of the economy. Methods are using different sets 
of initial assumptions and apply heterogeneous analytical techniques which lead 
to variety of results. Comparison of different methods can insure that one can 
estimate lower and upper boundary of unoffi cial economy. Moreover, although 
level of estimated unoffi cial economy differs, various methods do not differ sig-
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According to type of non-exhaustiveness, N6 type (inaccurate reporting by 
producers) is the most signifi cant in all observed period. Average share of type 
N6 is 72% of total non-exhaustiveness adjustments. Then the illegal activities fol-
low with share of 11%. Type N2 are not included in offi cial GDP at the moment 
because further investigations in this area will be done. Types N1, N3, N5 and N7 
are estimated between 3 and 6% of total exhaustiveness adjustments.
Regarding structural factors, non-exhaustiveness adjustments have the most 
signifi cant share in gross value added in Hotels and restaurants (NACE H) in the 
whole period. Average share of UE in activity H is 24.6% in GVA of specifi c activ-
ity.  This is followed by NACE F (Construction) with average UE share of 17% of 
GVA and NACE G (Wholesale and retail trade) with UE share of15.4% of GVA. 
On the other hand, total non-exhaustiveness adjustments has the lowest share in 
industries NACE L to O (Public administration, Education, Health and Other ser-
vices) in the whole period. It is in accordance with expectation because this sector 
mainly consists of government units.
According to majority of estimates, the trend of decreasing share of underground 
economy in GDP has stopped in 2008 and reversed in 2009. This fi nding supports the 
conclusion that the offi cial and the underground economy in Croatia are substitutes, 
working in opposite direction. Most important factors infl uencing the unoffi cial econ-
omy in Croatia (tax moral, tax burden and labour market conditions) worked in the 
same direction and induced increasing share of unoffi cial economy in recent period. 
This conclusion is in line with most results for other transition and NMS 
economies. It means that offi cial statistical data overestimate total economic activ-
ity (sum of offi cial and unoffi cial income) during periods of growth, while under-
estimating activity during recessions. 
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NESLUŽBENO GOSPODARSTVO U HRVATSKOJ: 
METODE MJERENJA I PROCJENE 
Sažetak
U skladu s preporukama Eurostata, BDP svake zemlje mora obuhvaćati ukupnu eko-
nomsku aktivnost. Sve članice Europske Unije i zemlje kandidati stoga su imale obvezu 
uključivanja procjene neslužbenog gospodarstva u službenu statistiku nacionalnih računa. 
Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske radio je na projektu poboljšanja obuhvata 
nacionalnih računa. U skladu s rezultatima toga projekta revidirani su službeni podaci 
iz područja nacionalnih računa na način da je obuhvat proširen i uključena je procjena 
dohotka ostvarenog u neslužbenom sektoru.
Rad prikazuje usporedbu rezultata različitih metoda procjene neslužbenog gospo-
darstva u Hrvatskoj. Rad prikazuje metode procjene neslužbenog gospodarstva korištene 
u relevantnoj literaturi iz ovog područja, i rezultate tih procjena. Nadalje, prikazana je 
Eurostatova metodologija procjene obuhvatnosti nacionalnih računa i rezultati za hrvatsko 
gospodarstvo. Dodatno, autor koristi i podatke iz ankete o radnoj snazi za procjenu broja 
zaposlenih koji nisu registrirani u službenoj statistici.
Cilj rada je testiranje hipoteze da premda različite metode procjene neslužbenog 
gospodarstva polaze od različitih pretpostavki i metodologije, u slučaju hrvatskog gospo-
darstva njihova primjena upućuje na zajednički zaključak o trendu kretanja neslužbenog 
gospodarstva u Hrvatskoj. Autor je zaključio da se u razdoblju ekonomskog rasta udio 
neslužbenog gospodarstva smanjivao, dok se u razdoblju recesije rastom udjela neslužbe-
nog gospodarstva u određenoj mjeri amortizirao negativni učinak recesije na smanjenje 
dohotka kućanstava.
Ključne riječi: Neslužbeno gospodarstvo, Eurostat metoda, Puni obuhvat nacional-
nih računa, MIMIC metoda, Hrvatska
